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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 119

Accident time: 11:10

Accident Date: 06/06/1998

Where it occurred: Tapa Tajbig, Ward 7,
Kabul City

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Demolition accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
hard

Date record created: 12/02/2004

Date last modified: 12/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate training (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group were working with a one man drill in two man
teams (changing about every 30 minutes).
An accident report was made on behalf of the UN MAC and made available in September
1999. The following summarises its content.
The accident occurred on agricultural land described as "medium hard". The victim had been
a deminer for 18 months and had last attended a revision course six months before. The mine
was identified as a PMN from fragments found at the site.
The deminer and his partner were unable to use detectors (because they were "reading
continuously" and so were prodding and excavating the area. Photographs of the area
showed flat, dry, agricultural land. The victim located a PMN and reported it to his Section
Leader" who told him to prepare a charge for its destruction. He lit the safety fuse and "rushed
towards the safe area". As he did so he stepped into an uncleared area. A mine detonated
and "the victim lost his right foot and got serious injuries to his left foot" at 11:10.
The investigators found that victim and his "command group" had ignored technical and
safety procedures. They cut the safety fuse to 50cm (rather than 100-120cm). The victim then
waited 20 seconds to ensure that the fuse was burning normally. The investigators felt that
this wasted time and further obliged the victim to hurry as he left the area. He ran, which was
against "procedures". Further, the investigators thought it possible that the safety lane was
poorly marked, so confusing the victim about where it was safe to tread.
The Team Leader stated that the land was heavily contaminated with old food tins and so the
detectors were reading continuously. He reported that 50cm of fuse was cut and that 250g of
demolition charge was used, and that the charge detonated 30 seconds after the accident
occurred. [If the victim waited 20 seconds after lighting the fuse, and it was 30 second burn,
the charge could not have gone off 30 seconds after the accident]. He thought the victim was
careless.
The Section Leader stated that the victim lost his left leg below the knee and had minor
injuries to his left foot when he "stepped over the mine in uncleared area and caused the
explosion".
The victim's partner reported that the placed charge detonated 25 seconds after the
accident.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the accident was caused by ignoring technical and safety
procedures. The Section Leader either cut the fuse too short himself or allowed the victim to
do so. This left the deminer with 50 seconds instead of the minimum of 100 seconds needed
to reach a safe area without haste.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that marking of safe lanes should be clear, fuses should be
cut long enough to avoid a need for haste and that disciplinary action should be taken against
the Team and Section leaders.
A sketch map of the site seemed to show that the victim deliberately crossed a 10m strip of
uncleared land and the accident occurred within three metres of the mine he was destroying.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 155

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 20 minutes

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: not recorded

Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hand
minor Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
No formal medical report was made available.
The accident report stated that the victim received first aid at the site and was taken to the
ICRC hospital in Kabul. After one day there he was flown to Peshawar, Pakistan to another
hospital. The investigators reported that the victim later "became mute". A letter to the
demining group's director dated 24th June 1998 reported that the victim had been in a coma
since he arrived at hospital.
The initial field treatment was listed as:
infusion Ringer Lactate 1000ml
analgesic inj-sosagen 30mg given I.M. at 11:20
Amp. Ampicillin 1gr I.V.
ATS 3000 units I.M.
The medic controlled bleeding with a tourniquet and pressure bandage, and also irrigated and
dressed the wounds. His sketch is reproduced below.
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The victim left for hospital at 11.23 when his pulse was recorded as 100/min, BP 135/90
"mmHg" and Respiration 20/min.
The victim arrived at hospital at 11:30 when his pulse was recorded at 100/min, BP at 130/90
and Respiration at 28/min.
He was given a general anaesthetic (ketamine IV) and a below knee amputation of his right
leg was performed along with debridment "of all other wounds". The hospital report concluded
with the line "he became unconscious after 14 hours" at the hospital.
Photographs in the file showed the victim during first treatment. His right foot was missing just
above the ankle. Lacerations to the left lower leg appeared minor and did not appear to affect
the victim's foot. There were also lacerations on the palm of his left hand.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the Team
Leader allowed safety procedures to be breached by using a short fuse.
The open admission of this breach in his statement implies that he may not have been aware
that he was breaking rules, and so may have been inadequately trained which would be a
serious management failing. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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